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Feminist Perspectives  
in Health Law
Seema Mohapatra and Lindsay F. Wiley
Mounting evidence from the field of social epidemiology1 demonstrates that social fac-tors play a crucial role in determining health 
outcomes.2 Law itself is a social determinant of health, 
structuring the relationships between health outcomes 
and poverty, racism, educational attainment, ableism, 
employment status, housing status, involvement in 
the criminal justice system, the built environment, the 
economic environment, the information environment, 
nationalism, homophobia, transphobia, misogyny, 
and more.3 As Scott Burris has written, “[r]esponding 
to the findings of … social epidemiology is perhaps the 
true ‘grand challenge’ of our time in public health.”4 
Some fret that reconceptualizing poverty, racism, and 
other social ills as health threats will privilege gov-
ernment intervention at the expense of liberty.5 Oth-
ers worry that embracing the expansive relationship 
between law and health threatens the coherence of 
health law as a distinct field of academic inquiry and 
offers few benefits in return.6 These criticisms beg the 
question: What does health law scholarship gain from 
viewing health as contingent on social structures? 
As feminists, we embrace the vast terrain that social 
epidemiology opens up for exploration by health law 
scholars. We view health law as an inherently dynamic 
and expansive field.7 What health law scholarship gains 
from the insights of social epidemiology is an invita-
tion to engage with the rich literature of critical legal 
theories that view law as an expression of social power.8 
Rather than claiming poverty law, disability law, edu-
cation law, housing law, employment law, criminal law, 
or any other field as health law, social epidemiology 
invites health law scholars to join ongoing efforts to 
examine how these diverse areas of law are intertwined 
with health law, how they support existing social injus-
tices, and how they reflect biases against the very peo-
ple they purport to serve. This engagement, we argue, 
has enormous potential to enrich health law scholar-
ship and teaching — on issues that relate to gender 
specifically, as well as other areas of inequality more 
broadly. 
In this essay, we put forward one group of critical 
perspectives, under the umbrella of feminist legal 
theory, as offering crucial but underutilized lenses 
for assessing and enriching health law and policy. By 
asking “the woman9 question,”10 feminist legal theo-
rists “proffer[] explanations of law’s complicity in the 
ongoing subordination of women and sexual minori-
ties, while also pursuing the possibilities within law 
for achieving lasting gender and sex equality.”11 By 
probing the ways in which “the modern legal subject 
has retained certain secondary characteristics that 
continue to cent[er] on the needs and political sensi-
bilities of an eighteenth-century male citizen sheltered 
by institutions such as the patriarchal family and the 
privileges of a master-servant mentality,”12 feminist 
frameworks help unpack how a male-centered view of 
law’s role in our social world is harmful.13 Examples 
of how health laws and policies have reflected and 
reinforced white male patriarchy abound, including 
how the law fails to protect reproductive health deci-
sions and instead treats it as an exception to accepted 
principles of bodily and decisional autonomy, restric-
tions on the practice of midwifery and nursing that 
privileged the professionalization of medical practice, 
and the notion that public measures to support access 
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to health care and healthy living conditions must be 
justified by exceptional circumstances against a back-
ground norm of personal responsibility.
We do not attempt to describe every theoretical 
framework within feminist legal theory that may be 
helpful to health law scholars and teachers. Instead, 
we draw on specific (and interrelated) theoretical 
frameworks developed by feminist legal theorists, 
including relational autonomy, intersectionality, femi-
nist critiques of the public-private divide, and vulner-
ability theory. The feminist theory of relational auton-
omy, championed by Jennifer Nedelsky and others, 
situates the legal subject within the context of social 
relationships, allowing “both law and rights [to] be 
understood in terms of the relations they structure 
— and how those relations can structure core values, 
such as autonomy.”14 Feminists emphasizing the inter-
sectionality of race and gender, in an approach pio-
neered by Kimberlé Crenshaw,15 highlight the limits 
of rights- and choice-based feminism and broaden 
the scope of feminist legal inquiry in health law and 
policy beyond the issue of reproductive rights.16 Femi-
nist legal theorists’ foundational critique of the public-
private divide in law reveals how shielding the private 
sphere from government intervention and support 
reinforces patriarchal notions of individual liberty (for 
some) and private responsibility (often unfulfilled or 
unfulfillable) that limit government interventions to 
promote health and wellbeing.17 Vulnerability theory, 
pioneered by Martha Albertson Fineman, challenges 
the privatization18 and stigmatization of dependency 
by emphasizing that all people are inherently vulner-
able and dependent on social support to build resil-
ience, which a responsive state is obligated to provide.19
We argue that these frameworks provide insights 
relevant not only to issues that obviously relate to gen-
der (such as those associated with reproductive and 
sexual health or sex-based discrimination by health 
care providers, private insurance companies, or public 
health programs), but also to matters of health care 
choice, quality, and access,20 and public health, that 
are less obviously gender-related.21 Feminist perspec-
tives are particularly apt at a time when judges are 
being called on to craft resolutions to disputes over 
sex and gender that will reverberate for generations.22 
Feminist perspectives on the most pressing issues 
in health law and policy also promise to enrich stu-
dent learning and further the development of health 
law scholarship as a field. This essay maps three key 
areas of existing scholarship and future inquiry at the 
intersection of health law and feminist legal theory: 
(I) patient choice and relational autonomy, (II) patri-
archy, power, and patient safety, and (III) access to 
health care and healthy living conditions at the pub-
lic-private divide. In each of these areas, we highlight 
examples of scholarship using feminist legal theory 
frameworks to advance health justice and also sug-
gest additional challenges in health law teaching and 
scholarship that would benefit from such analysis.
I. Patient Choice and Relational Autonomy
Matters of choice and autonomy are hotly contested 
within feminist legal theory. Women’s reproductive 
freedom was a dominant focus of feminist move-
ments and classically liberal feminist legal theory in 
the mid-twentieth century. Recent developments, 
such as abortion informed consent laws,23 and con-
cerns about obstetric violence,24 are sparking health 
law scholarship at the intersection of reproductive jus-
tice and health justice, breaking down the silos that 
have traditionally separated reproductive health from 
health law and policy writ large.25 These developments 
create new opportunities to enrich health law and 
policy scholarship by applying feminist perspectives. 
Feminist theories, including the concepts of relational 
autonomy and intersectionality, can help inform pri-
orities, values, limitations, and solutions to various 
aspects of health care decision-making, including with 
respect to matters unrelated to reproduction.
Reproductive Health Care Decisions
In the late-twentieth century, reproductive justice 
advocates adopted an intersectional perspective to 
broaden their focus beyond the right to choose abor-
tion. Loretta Ross, one of the founders of the repro-
ductive justice movement, purposefully avoided 
the term “pro-choice” because she noted that Black 
women often face few real choices.26 Engaging with a 
reproductive justice frame allows a rich discussion of 
the unique problems that Black women face in raising 
children and accessing health care, including abor-
tion and proper maternity and post-maternity care, 
an issue we will turn to below. But even as that focus 
has expanded to encompass the broader context in 
which women make decisions about whether to have 
children and how to parent the children they have, the 
authors of foundational works on reproductive rights 
and reproductive justice have only engaged health law 
and policy frameworks to a limited extent. 
The feminist theory of relational autonomy is par-
ticularly relevant, but undertheorized, in health care 
law. The concept of relational autonomy focuses on 
the context in which people make decisions.27 A rela-
tional self emerges from and is continuously shaped 
by the context of multiple relationships with other 
individuals and institutions — some of which can pro-
mote flourishing and some of which can oppress.28 
Relational autonomy acknowledges that autonomy is 
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not a black and white concept where you either are 
autonomous or you are not. It views the individual as 
embedded within a complex set of relationships.29
Relational autonomy allows us to look beyond 
formal informed consent and acknowledge the real-
ity that each individual choice — about reproductive 
health care, health care more generally, and other mat-
ters related to health — occurs within a complex web 
of personal and societal relationships, pressures, and 
obligations.30 In the health care arena, this includes 
examining the constraints and influences a patient 
faces when making any health care decision. Just 
because a person consents to a procedure or course 
of action does not necessarily mean that such consent 
is a result of an autonomous decision. For example, 
Pamela Laufer-Ukeles has critiqued the narrowness 
of the informed consent doctrine in the context of 
reproductive choices, noting that it ignores the politi-
cal and public context of abortion and other reproduc-
tive decision-making.31 She suggests that “relational 
autonomy … be used to transform the informed con-
sent process into a more balanced and comprehensive 
consultation that better supports women’s autonomy 
in the context of reproductive choices.”32 
Health Care Decisions beyond Reproductive Health
Relational autonomy — and feminist legal theory more 
broadly — have obvious relevance to matters of repro-
ductive choice. But they could also be applied to health 
care decisions that range far beyond reproduction. The 
concept of relational autonomy has been applied in 
the context of reproductive choices,33 and reproduc-
tive technologies,34 as well as to allocation of health 
care resources,35 and end-of-life decisions.36 It has the 
potential to be applied in other contexts as well.
Jocelyn Downie and Jennifer Llewellyn describe 
relational theory “to be a theoretical framework with 
extraordinary potential for health law and policy.”37 
Downie and Llewellyn define autonomy under a rela-
tional lens as “the capacity for defining, questioning, 
revising, pursuing one’s interests and goals that is 
exercised, protected, and corroded within relation-
ships and social structures which together shape the 
individual and determine others’ responses to her.”38 
Health law scholarship considering any form of health-
care decision-making could benefit from engaging 
with Downie and Llewellyn’s theoretical vision of 
autonomy. Recently, for example, Megan Wright has 
noted that “structural changes to … the provision and 
financing of long-term care … could decrease the bur-
den on families, which may change how people make 
decisions at the end of life. The background condi-
tions of social and economic inequality decrease true 
autonomy.”39 
One area particularly ripe for further consideration 
from a relational autonomy perspective is patient 
compliance with medical advice, particularly at a time 
when health care providers are increasingly subject 
to financial incentives that hold them responsible for 
patient outcomes.40 A wide variety of factors, such as 
lack of familial support, financial insecurity, hous-
ing insecurity, experiences with racism, misogyny, 
homophobia and other forms of psychosocial stress, 
can affect whether and how a patient can adhere to a 
prescribed course of treatment. People make individ-
ual health care decisions based upon where they are 
situated. Considering the relational context in which 
health care decision-making is occurring is important 
to consider, especially when theorizing the role of law 
in such decisions and teaching students about patient 
choice and patient responsibility.
II. Patriarchy, Power, and Patient Safety
Most health law courses address the role of law as a 
tool for promoting health care quality and patient 
safety. Medical errors are a serious health care issue, 
killing more people yearly in the United States than 
car accidents, AIDS, or breast cancer.41 Efforts to 
tackle medical errors and other problems with quality 
of care have generated substantial health law schol-
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arship. However, the hierarchical and gendered rela-
tionship between nursing and medicine and between 
the doctor and patient, demonstrated throughout 
health care case law, and how this affects patient care 
and patient dignity, remains underexplored. These 
issues may receive more sustained attention from 
health law scholars in response to research revealing 
that African-American, Native American and Alaska 
Native women are three times more likely to die from 
pregnancy related causes, compared to white women 
in the United States.42  These startling disparities, 
which have captured national media attention, are 
ripe for an intersectional health law analysis focus-
ing on reproductive justice, health justice, gender, and 
racial justice.
Gender Dynamics in the Health Care Workforce
Studies show that nurses and allied health profes-
sionals often do not communicate their opinions to 
physicians, even when it could prevent mistakes and 
improve the patient experience in clinical care.43 
Medical sociologists focusing on these dynamics have 
generated a rich body of literature, ripe for incorpora-
tion into health law teaching and scholarship. As Lisa 
Ikemoto has noted, adopting an intersectional lens, 
“the health system, and the medical hierarchy within 
it, replicate many of society’s power relationships: 
between doctors and nurses, doctors and clients and 
nurses and clients.”44 Not surprisingly, power imbal-
ances between physicians, nurses, and allied health 
workers have been demonstrated to result in poorer 
health outcomes for patients.45 
A collaborative model, rather than a hierarchical 
model, may improve clinical care quality.46 Examin-
ing the racial and gender dynamics of the health care 
workforce with an intersectional lens are valuable 
additions to the health law literature, given the racial 
and gender composition of hospital staff.47 Sociolo-
gist Evelyn Nakano Glenn has studied the hierarchi-
cal race and gender division of labor at hospitals: “at 
the top are the physicians, setting policy and initiating 
work for others; they are disproportionately white and 
male. Directly below, performing medical tasks and 
patient care as delegated by physicians and enforcing 
hospital rules, are the registered nurses …, who are 
overwhelmingly female and disproportionately white. 
Under the registered nurses and often supervised by 
them are the licensed practical nurses … , also female 
but disproportionately women of color.”48 Jasmine 
Harris, for example, has developed similar insights in 
the health law sphere, exploring how the ACA’s provi-
sions promoting access to care may deconstruct “tra-
ditional hierarchies and power allocation within the 
medical profession itself (most notably between doc-
tors and nurses) as well as between formal health care 
workers, natural healers, and community supports.”49 
The provisions of the ACA promoting integrated care 
delivery models also lend themselves to examination 
from an intersectional feminist perspective.
Another quality of care workforce issue that could 
benefit from feminist legal theorizing are the signifi-
cant gender imbalances in certain specialties within 
medicine. Women who are physicians have been found 
to adopt “the caring” stereotype, which may actually 
enhance patient care. However, due to gender imbal-
ances in training and gender stereotypes, women phy-
sicians choose surgical fields at much lower rates than 
male physicians. #ILookLikeASurgeon, a viral online 
campaign with over a billion impressions, was a social 
media effort to normalize and celebrate women sur-
geons.50 The lack of women in certain medical special-
ties is both a quality of care and access to care issue. 
As to access, if a patient would prefer to have a female 
surgeon operate on her, that may not be an option due 
to the lack of women in certain surgical fields.51 In 
terms of quality, some studies have shown that there 
may be better clinical outcomes with a female doctor, 
especially for female patients.52 There could be myriad 
reasons for these studies’ outcomes, beyond skill of 
female physicians, and they are worth unpacking with 
a critical feminist lens. 
Gender Dynamics in the Doctor-Patient Encounter
Some health law scholars have used the work of social 
scientists to analyze the impact of gender dynamics 
within medicine on quality health care. For example, 
Ikemoto has utilized Sue Fisher’s fieldwork in wom-
en’s health clinics to demonstrate the power imbal-
ances that can exist in a patient encounter, especially 
“where the doctor is typically male, the patients are 
female and often racial minorities, and the doctor has 
both the formal education to claim expertise and more 
formal education than the typical patient.”53 Ikemoto 
demonstrates how such doctor-patient encounters 
can interfere with the communication necessary for 
safe and appropriate medical treatment. 
The sociological literature also discusses gendered 
relationships between physicians and patients. Health 
law scholars interested in quality of care may find 
such literature beneficial in their work. Many socio-
logical studies show that both patients54 and nurses55 
undermine female physicians’ authority and legiti-
macy. Additionally, other studies show that physicians 
often treat patients differently based on their gender 
or race.56 In health law classes, teachers may find a dis-
cussion of gender dynamics, power relationships, and 
stereotyping would add to students’ understanding of 
health care quality and malpractice liability. 
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For example, an intersectional feminist analysis of 
disparities in maternal mortality would consider the 
power dynamics at play when an African-American 
woman seeks prenatal care. Are African-American 
care providers available to her, which has been associ-
ated with better outcomes? Is the woman facing dif-
ferent treatment due to her race in the obstetrician’s 
office or not being offered the same services? This is 
a multi-faceted issue, but one proposed intervention 
has been to have midwives, rather than physicians, 
attend to births.57 The racial makeup of midwives is 
much more diverse than that of obstetricians, which 
may make a difference in provider-patient trust and 
communication.58 Midwives, who are mostly female, 
and physicians, who have historically been mostly 
male, have a long history of conflict and turf wars.59 
Similar dynamics may also be at work with respect 
to other health care disparities. For example, women 
who experience heart attacks are less likely to survive 
than their male counterparts, but their survival rates 
are higher when they are cared for by female physi-
cians.60 Examining how race and gender shape these 
power dynamics would lead to a richer understanding 
and perhaps different, more effective solutions target-
ing barriers to diversity among health care providers. 
Many legal frames exist for analyzing and responding 
to these disparities, but we are suggesting that femi-
nist legal theories offer an important addition to the 
health law toolbox.
III. Access to Health Care and Healthy Living 
Conditions at the Public-Private Divide 
What counts as a health problem, and which of these 
problems are public, rather than merely personal? 
Which people and which conditions trigger collective 
health care financing? Which health threats warrant 
government efforts to secure healthy living conditions 
for all members of our society? These questions at the 
heart of health law and policy seek to demarcate a bor-
der between the public and the private. The contested 
public-private divide is also a crucial focus of feminist 
scholarship and pedagogy.61 According to a common 
feminist critique, “‘public and private’ is the source of 
women’s oppression … because the private realm is 
exempt from liberal principles and political account-
ability.”62 Informed by women’s lived experience, 
feminism has embraced the notion that “the personal 
is political.”63 Some feminist legal theorists, notably 
Martha Albertson Fineman, have gone further, argu-
ing that the default norm of personal responsibility 
and the inaccurate assumption that the universal legal 
subject is autonomous and independent have eroded 
the ability of our communities to provide the resources 
needed for human flourishing.64
Access to Health Care
The divide between personal responsibility and pub-
lic responsibility for securing access to health care is 
ripe for analysis from feminist perspectives. Although 
health care has traditionally been dominated by pri-
vate, common law doctrines privileging health care 
providers’ and insurers’ freedom of contract, it is now 
heavily regulated in ways that purport to secure pub-
lic values, including equality, dignity, and distributive 
justice. The Affordable Care Act, in particular, has 
nudged health care financing and delivery away from 
an individualistic actuarial fairness model (in which 
each person is responsible for her own care and that of 
her family) toward a mutual aid model that embraces 
social solidarity (in which at least some basic level of 
care for at least some people is financed collectively 
through publicly financed programs and mandated 
risk pooling in the private market).65 Expanded health 
care civil rights protections, requirements that insur-
ers must take all comers, and restrictions on their 
ability to charge differential rates based on individual 
risk factors are transforming health care. As Eliza-
beth McCuskey has described it, there is a “mutuality 
inherent in public health and the pooling of risk” and 
thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that the feminist cri-
tique of the divide between public and private respon-
sibility for human flourishing has “quietly taken root” 
in health reform.66 
Feminist legal scholars have long argued that access 
to health care is a feminist issue and have advocated 
for universal health care as a necessary condition 
for economic and racial justice. “Women’s daily rela-
tionship to securing and maintaining health care for 
themselves and their children,” as Susan Waysdorf has 
argued, “[is] a major factor in keeping women and 
their families locked in poverty.”67 The ACA’s reforms 
are consistent with the view that the need for preven-
tive care and medically necessary treatment, regard-
less of gender, should trigger a mutual aid response; 
they are matters of public, not merely private, respon-
sibility.68 As McCuskey points out, “among the ACA’s 
federal insurance reforms were several provisions that 
directly address gender disparities: explicit prohibi-
tion of sex discrimination by any recipient of federal 
health care funds (including insurance companies, 
providers, and assistance programs),  prohibition 
of gender rating[, which has historically produced 
higher premiums for women], federalizing ‘essential 
health benefits’ to include women’s preventive care 
without cost-sharing and maternity and newborn 
care, and prohibiting pre-existing condition penalties 
or exclusions, which disproportionately disadvantaged 
women.”69 Critics of the ACA argue that they “shouldn’t 
have to pay for everyone else’s pregnancies,”70 uninten-
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tionally highlighting the implications of the public-
private divide for women’s health care access.
The role of public and private decisionmakers in 
overseeing access to health care — through the design 
of benefits packages as well as case-by-case review 
of claims for coverage or reimbursement — has also 
garnered attention from feminist legal scholars. They 
have questioned whether managed care practices, 
which include utilization review as well as restric-
tive provider networks and payment structures that 
incentivize providers to limit patient access to spe-
cialty care, might disproportionately harm women.71 
As Vicki MacDougall put it, “whether managed care 
has the built in propensity to perpetuate — if not sanc-
tion and encourage — medical gender bias to the det-
riment of the health of women enrolled in managed 
care plans”72 is more relevant than ever now as man-
aged care practices continue to evolve and expand 
beyond private insurance to Medicaid and Medicare.
Several health law scholars examining the shift-
ing public-private divide in health care access and 
financing post-ACA have found Martha Albertson 
Fineman’s vulnerability theory73 to be a particularly 
fruitful avenue for integrating feminist perspectives 
into their analysis of issues ranging from The shared 
vulnerability frame has been used to analyze a wide 
variety of health related topics, such as the AIDS epi-
demic74 and elder care,75 to conscience-based restric-
tions on health care services.76 Vulnerability theory 
highlights the inevitable and universal vulnerabil-
ity and dependency of legal subjects within families, 
communities, and other social institutions.77 Univer-
sal vulnerability undermines the purported divide 
between public and private responsibility by high-
lighting the extent to which individuals are universally 
and inevitably dependent on society and demanding a 
responsive state to support the resources necessary for 
resilience.78 Drawing on vulnerability analysis, Nicole 
Huberfeld and Jessica Roberts have argued that “that 
the preference for private ‘hidden’ government assis-
tance over public ‘visible’ government assistance [in 
health care policy] stems from the American myth 
of self reliance.”79 Matthew B. Lawrence has built on 
shared vulnerability analysis and other feminist and 
communitarian theoretical frameworks to argue that 
“safety net” programs are in need of a new metaphor 
that rejects the exceptionalism of a safety net as a last 
resort and embraces the ecosystem of government 
programs and other social structures that determine 
our access to health care and healthy living condi-
tions.80 Vulnerability analysis also casts suspicion on 
the relegation of care work, including a great deal 
of health care work, to the private sphere where it 
is undervalued and disproportionately provided by 
women on an uncompensated basis. Allison Hoffman 
has applied these insights to reimagine public and 
private responsibility for long-term care, which is not 
covered by private health insurance or Medicare.81 In 
a work in progress, one of us (Wiley) is exploring the 
implications of universal vulnerability for proposals to 
expand access to public health care programs. Addi-
tional areas that would lend themselves well to vulner-
ability analysis include Medicaid work requirements 
and wellness programs that put the onus on insureds 
Several health law scholars examining the shifting public-private divide in 
health care access and financing post-ACA have found Martha Albertson 
Fineman’s vulnerability theory to be a particularly fruitful avenue for 
integrating feminist perspectives into their analysis of issues ranging from 
The shared vulnerability frame has been used to analyze a wide variety 
of health related topics, such as the AIDS epidemic and elder care, to 
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subjects within families, communities, and other social institutions. 
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state to support the resources necessary for resilience.
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and public program enrollees to improve their health 
outcomes or have their coverage eroded. 
The increasingly collective approach to health care 
financing in the United States begs important ques-
tions about which people and which conditions trigger 
a mutual aid response, questions with crucial impli-
cations for women, girls, gender and sexual minori-
ties, and other historically marginalized groups. Legal 
scholars have paid particular attention to access to 
health care for women living with HIV/AIDS82 as well 
as women who access health care primarily through 
systems that segregate them from the mainstream 
population, such as women who are veterans,83 and 
women who are incarcerated.84 Medha Makhlouf has 
explored the application of the health justice frame-
work, which has feminist roots, to health care access 
for immigrants, many of whom are excluded from 
public programs.85 With regard to which conditions 
and which treatments should be collectively financed, 
the question of whether preventive care is included 
in the basket of covered services86 is of crucial impor-
tance to women and girls, who are vulnerable to breast 
and cervical cancers for which prevention and early 
detection are essential. Several legal scholars, includ-
ing one of us (Mohapatra), have examined the role 
of collective financing, state interests, and feminist 
engagement in access to reproductive health care for 
women and girls, which has been exceptionalized by 
being segregated from and subjected to heightened 
regulation compared to mainstream health care.87 Sta-
cey Tovino has analyzed the implications of improved 
scientific understanding of post-partum depression 
for health law and policy, including interpretation 
of health insurance policy exclusionary clauses and 
mental health parity legislation.88 Other scholars have 
questioned the exceptionalism of infertility treatment, 
which is often excluded from coverage by private 
insurers and public programs.89 The groundbreaking 
work of these scholars — and many others we do not 
have sufficient space to mention — draws on feminist 
perspectives, and there is always more to be done. 
Access to Healthy Living Conditions
In addition to determining “what we owe each other” 
with regard to medical treatment, the public-private 
divide — and feminist critiques of it — have implica-
tions for “social obligation[s] to protect and promote 
health” more broadly.90 As Norman Daniels has put 
it, “social justice prevents ill health in more ways than 
through health care alone.”91 Thus, feminist commen-
tary on the public-private divide also has implications 
for laws and policies that determine access to healthy 
living conditions and other social determinants of 
good health. 
Heart disease, diabetes, and cancer are intuitively 
framed as “lifestyle” diseases: the result of autono-
mous choices by individuals, and thus a matter of 
private concern and personal responsibility.92 Other 
health concerns, such as menstrual hygiene, have 
been rendered taboo and largely invisible within the 
public realm.93 As the government takes on a greater 
role in paying for costly medical treatment, the pub-
lic’s interest in preventing disease and injury grows.94 
At the same time, public health research is revealing 
the important role played by social, economic, and 
environmental factors — including racism, ableism, 
misogyny, homophobia, and transphobia — in con-
straining individual behavior choices and determin-
ing health outcomes. The result is an emerging debate 
over the legitimate scope of the government’s role in 
ensuring access not just to health care, but to healthy 
lifestyles and living conditions as well. Increasingly, 
health threats like diabetes, heart disease, and men-
strual hygiene are not simply viewed as personal 
failures to be addressed through clinical prevention, 
treatment, and education campaigns. As one of us 
(Wiley) has argued elsewhere, in the era of new public 
health, these are increasingly seen as public problems 
amenable to structural solutions.95 
While we embrace the potential of new public 
health law to address racial, economic, and gender-
based disparities in health, we do so with a wary eye 
toward the potential for social biases to shape pater-
nalistic interventions that do more harm than good. 
Historically, women, girls, and people with minority 
sexual orientations and gender identities have dispro-
portionately borne the burden of paternalistic poli-
cies aimed at securing the public’s health and welfare. 
The supposedly private nature of their choices about 
sexual practices (about sex work, use of prophylac-
tics, and more) and their parenting choices (about 
risks during pregnancy, childhood vaccinations, giv-
ing children freedom to develop their independence, 
and more) does not shield them from government 
intervention intended for their own good (but harm-
ful in practice).96 This is true even as the supposedly 
private nature of the realms (e.g., homes, schools, 
workplaces, and religious communities) in which they 
[these marginalized groups] most commonly experi-
ence violence, unacceptably unsanitary conditions, 
and other forms of oppression insulates their oppres-
sors (e.g., parents, intimate partners, superiors, and 
landlords) from consequences. The work of feminist 
public health ethicists, such as Wendy Rogers, offers a 
critical framework for probing the power differentials 
at play in the processes and substance of public health 
laws, policies, and governance.97 The implications of 
the public-private divide for access to healthy living 
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conditions merits further exploration from feminist 
health law scholars.
Conclusion
In each of the three areas we have highlighted in this 
essay, laws and policies express and reinforce patriar-
chal and misogynistic ideologies and social structures 
that oppress women, girls, and people with minority 
sexual orientations and identities. Uniting these areas 
of inquiry is a nagging question central to the rela-
tionship between critical legal scholarship (including 
feminist scholarship) and pragmatic action to combat 
injustice: Can we use legal rights to achieve our aims 
even as we recognize them as tainted tools that have 
propped up oppressive social structures? The ques-
tion has been productively explored by comparative 
health law scholars,98 and it may also be lurking in the 
background of U.S. health reform (a question ripe for 
further exploration). As Robert A. Williams, writing 
about advocacy by indigenous people and other people 
of color, put it, “rights rhetoric is a primitive weapon, 
but one we cannot afford to ignore or denigrate, 
though in our hearts we may question its ultimate util-
ity or relevance once we secure our positions  … [W]e 
cannot afford the luxury of a wholly negative critique 
which distances and alienates an already historically 
proven hostile audience … We have no choice but to 
take rights aggressively while we buy the time needed 
to perfect new weapons out of the materials at hand 
provided by our insurrectionist discursive traditions.”99 
As Robin West has written, “[f]eminist legal theorists 
both directly and indirectly contribute to the construc-
tion of various fields of law — civil rights law, constitu-
tional law, criminal law, tort law, contract law, family 
law, international law and private law”100 and, as we 
argue in this essay, health law. “That degree of engage-
ment itself rests on the bedrock assumption that those 
efforts can at least sometimes bear fruit. Thus, feminist 
legal theory taken it its entirety has shown, if not con-
sistently expressed, a view of law as not only a mecha-
nism for the subordination of over half the human 
community but also a potential vehicle for equalizing 
and improving the quality of life for women and all 
gender and sexual minorities.”101 A feminist agenda for 
health law and policy must grapple with this dilemma. 
We hope the result will be a flourishing critical dis-
course combined with pragmatic calls to deploy laws 
and policies as weapons to combat gender injustice 
and health injustice more broadly.
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